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Abstract—Obfuscation is a technique for protecting
hardware intellectual property (IP) blocks against
reverse engineering, piracy, and malicious modifica-
tions. Current obfuscation efforts mainly focus on
functional locking of a design to prevent black-box
usage. They do not directly address hiding design
intent through structural transformations, which is
an important objective of obfuscation. We note that
current obfuscation techniques incorporate only: (1)
local, and (2) predictable changes in circuit topology.
In this paper, we present SAIL, a structural attack
on obfuscation using machine learning (ML) models
that exposes a critical vulnerability of these meth-
ods. Through this attack, we demonstrate that the
gate-level structure of an obfuscated design can be
retrieved in most parts through a systematic set of
steps. The proposed attack is applicable to all forms
of logic obfuscation, and significantly more powerful
than existing attacks, e.g., SAT-based attacks, since
it does not require the availability of golden func-
tional responses (e.g. an unlocked IC). Evaluation
on benchmark circuits show that we can recover an
average of around 84% (up to 95%) transformations
introduced by obfuscation. We also show that this
attack is scalable, flexible, and versatile.
I. Introduction
Hardware intellectual property (IP) based system-on-
chip (SoC) design has become a prevalent practice in the
semiconductor industry. However, the global economic
trend that dictates a horizontal business model incorpo-
rates many untrusted parties in the modern chip design
flow. In particular, most chip designers rely on untrusted
3-rd party fabrication facilities. Such a trend diminishes
a chip designer’s control on the IPs and makes them
vulnerable to various forms of attacks, including piracy,
reverse-engineering, overproduction, malicious modifica-
tions, or Trojan attacks, leading to serious economic and
security threats [11] [3]. To address these security issues,
hardware obfuscation techniques have been actively stud-
ied for the past decade. They aim at transforming a de-
sign - both functionally and structurally based on a key,
such that an obfuscated design functions correctly only
if the right key inputs are provided. Fig. 1, summarizes
the two main goals for obfuscation: 1) preventing black-
box usage, and 2) hiding design intent. Using functional
locking techniques such as XOR gate insertion locking
scheme [5], [6], [7], black-box usage of the IP/IC can be
prevented. However, an attacker may also be interested in
understanding the intent of a design through reverse en-
gineering of the netlist. In order to address this important
need, judicious structural transformations need to be
introduced in a design. Current obfuscation approaches
primarily rely on: 1) insertion of various modification
cells (e.g., XOR, XNOR gates) controlled by key bits,
Fig. 1: Primary objectives of Hardware Obfuscation.
and 2) re-synthesis of the design after obfuscation, to
obtain any structural changes in the design.
Like any security solutions, IP protection achieved
through obfuscation largely depends on its robustness
against possible attacks. Over the years, several attacks
on obfuscation have been proposed, which broadly fall
into two categories: 1) functional attacks, such as SAT
attack [2], and 2) structural attacks, such as ANTI-
SAT block removal attack [4]. However, most reported
attacks on obfuscation have been functional attacks. The
only structural attack [4], is actually not designed to
deobfuscate an IP, but to facilitate a subsequent SAT
attack [2]. Based on a thorough statistical analysis, we
make two key observations regarding structural changes:
1) obfuscation introduces sparse and local structural
changes in a design, and 2) the changes are very deter-
ministic (i.e., follow a set of well-known logic synthesis
rules). Motivated by these observations, we introduce a
new paradigm of attack on obfuscation, called SAIL
(Structural Analysis using Machine Learning), which
exposes a critical vulnerability in logic obfuscation ap-
proaches. It can retrieve the original design and hence,
the design intent, through structural analysis guided by
machine learning. Given an obfuscated design, we extract
Fig. 2: Overview of major steps in the SAIL Attack Flow.
each obfuscation gate locality (subgraphs, considering
netlist as a graph) and revert them to their pre-synthesis
state using the reconstruction neural network trained
on 11160 [Pre-Synthesis, Post-Synthesis] locality pairs.
Using this information gained on the pre-synthesis obfus-
cated netlist, an attacker can more easily carry out key
guessing and reverse engineering attacks by observing the
structure. We also use a change prediction ML model to
improve accuracy and reduce computation time.
SAIL is a more powerful attack than SAT [2] based
functional attacks due to the following reasons: (1) unlike
SAT, SAIL does not require golden responses, e.g., from
an unlocked IP, which may be difficult to obtain for an
attacker, 2) it can be applied to both combinational and
sequential designs, 3) unlike SAT attack, which fails for
specific functions, e.g., multiplier, it works well for all
designs and does not depend on the underlying boolean
function, and finally, 4) it is scalable in terms of accuracy
and computation time with respect to both key and
benchmark size. We quantitatively and qualitatively ana-
lyze the effectiveness of SAIL attack using the systematic
framework and tool that we have developed as shown
in Fig. 2. From our results, we demonstrate that SAIL
attack is very effective against different key gate insertion
heuristics and key sizes. We achieve an average of 84.14%,
and up to 94.98% recovery of the obfuscated structures
for a set of benchmark circuits.
In particular, we make the following key contributions:
• We analyze, both quantitatively and qualitatively,
the nature of structural changes in a gate-level
netlist introduced due to different steps of obfus-
cation. We present the salient observations in this
regard that create the foundation of the proposed
attack.
• We present a complete framework of SAIL attack
with systematic set of steps that builds on this
analysis. It includes (1) Change Prediction Model
that can predict whether the obfuscation gates have
undergone changes due to obfuscation; and (2) a
Reconstruction Model that can locally revert the
structural changes post re-synthesis.
• We also present construction of a Change Prediction
Boosted Reconstruction Model using both the Recon-
struction Model and the Change Prediction Model
for improved recovery.
• Finally, we present comprehensive evaluation of the
attack on benchmark circuits and demonstrate that
it is scalable with respect to the key length, different
key-gate insertion heuristics, and design size.
II. Background and Related Works
Logic obfuscation attempts to hide the functionality
of a design by inserting gates that act as a lock and
are controlled by key inputs. Functional behavior in
the design is only restored upon entering the correct
key. In general, there are two types of logic locking:
combinational and sequential. For combinational logic
locking, combinational gates (XOR/XNOR, AND, etc.)
are inserted into a design with one input serving as a
key-bit. To lock a design with an N -bit key at least
N combinational key-gates must be added. On the
other hand, sequential logic locking modifies the finite
state machine by adding additional key-state transitions.
These transitions are properly traversed by applying the
correct sequence of key-bits and subsequently unlock the
design. The focus of this paper is on combinational logic
locking. In this obfuscation scheme [5], [6], [7], a design
is locked to hide functionality with an N -bit key by
inserting appropriate key gates (e.g., XOR for key-bit
‘0’ and XOR followed by an inverter for key-bit ‘1’).
Most of the attacks on obfuscation try to retrieve
the key, based on functional analysis of the design. A
key sensitization attack tries to retrieve the key-bits by
applying a pattern of non-key inputs such that a key-
input is mapped to an observable output (sensitization)
[13]. In [2], a SAT-based algorithm is proposed to com-
pletely or partially retrieve the key from a combinational
design. It requires the obfuscated netlist and an unlocked
IC/netlist is required to carry out the attack. Moreover,
SAT formulation is an NP-Complete problem and the
heuristic-based solutions are not guaranteed to give a
solution within reasonable time. Different protections [9],
[10], [8] against SAT attack [2] have been proposed that
generally involve adding extra logic to increase either
the number of iterations of the attack or the time to
complete each iteration. In [1], an approximate key is
retrieved that shows output corruptibility for very few
inputs and can bypass the protections offered by [9]. To
the best of our knowledge, the only structural attack on
obfuscation [4] is aimed at removal of ANTI-SAT blocks
[9] to facilitate a subsequent SAT attack. Conversely, our
work aims at quantitatively and qualitatively analyzing
and evaluating the effect of obfuscation on the structure
of the gate-level netlist and the deterministic heuristics
involved in structural hiding. The only ML based attack
on obfuscation [12] is a key retrieval attack, which also
requires an unlocked IC and is expected to suffer from
scalability issues. In comparison, we propose a netlist
structural analysis based attack that does not require
golden responses and is very scalable.
III. Motivation
In this section, we discuss two fundamental observa-
tions on obfuscation-induced structural changes and we
justify the use of machine learning models for structural
analysis based attacks.
A. Obfuscation Induced Changes Are Local
When a netlist is obfuscated using a XOR-based lock-
ing scheme, a re-synthesis of the netlist is performed in an
attempt to camouflage the key-gates that are inserted. In
the best case, the key XOR-Gate itself will combine with
local gates and transform into a new structure or cease
to be connected to the Key Input. We refer to this as
Level−3 change. In a slightly worse case, the XOR-Gate
inserted due to obfuscation may remain intact but its
neighboring gates may change due to logic simplification.
We call this a Level−2 change. Finally, the third scenario
observed involves no change of the inserted obfuscation
gates or surrounding gates after re-synthesis, referred to
as Level− 1 changes. As a result, the obfuscated design
remains vulnerable to removal and key guessing attacks.
Moreover, we observe that this process does not aid in
hiding the design intent and fails to obfuscate the design
from a reverse engineering standpoint.
In Table I, for 3720 gate localities, we note 36.5% of
key inserted localities do not go through any structural
TABLE I: Number of each type of changes for IPs.
Level-1 Level-2 Level-3
c1355 33 87 0
c1908 31 88 1
c2670 45 66 9
c3540 205 256 19
c5315 321 562 77
c6288 432 482 46
c7552 291 591 78
Avg 1358 (36.50%) 2132 (57.31%) 230 (6.18%)
change. Another 57.31% of the localities only show Level-
2 changes which are very easy to revert using certain rules
which can be manually devised or learned through statis-
tical methods. Only the remaining 6.18% of the localities
are properly obfuscated. However, some of these changes
are predictable and can be locally reverted as well with
the help of statistically generated rules/algorithms.
In Fig. 3(a)-(d), we show the most common Level-
2 and Level-3 changes that we have observed during
our experiments and the resulting localities after we
perform the reconstruction. In Fig. 3(a), we see the
inverter moving from behind the XOR gate to its front.
This transformation is a very common scenario and can
confuse the reverse engineer into thinking the Inverter is
not an obfuscation gate. By observing the locality (up to
10 gates) around the key-Gate, our statistically learned
rules can determine the state of the locality before syn-
thesis and recover it, thereby removing confusion. In Fig.
3(b), we observe a very common level-3 change, where
the inverter comes between the key input wire and the
XOR gate. This change can also be easily recovered and
stitched back into the design. Fig. 3(c) and Fig. 3(d)
depict more complex level-3 changes but our models are
still able to locally recover from such changes.
B. Why Machine Learning? The Synthesis Tool Opti-
mization is Deterministic
In the previous section, we have statistically estab-
lished that the changes induced by obfuscation gates are
local and limited. We can go one step further and try to
recover, from these limited changes, a local snapshot of
the key-gate inserted region. Recovering a small locality
around the obfuscation gate connected to the key input
wire is enough to obtain insight into the obfuscation that
was carried out.
Given the designs before and after synthesis, we enu-
merate each unique transformation (each unique [Input
Locality, Output Locality] pair) carried out by the syn-
thesis tool. We observe that very few rules are used by
the synthesis tool for carrying out most of the transfor-
mations. In Table II, we observe 10.69% of the trans-
formations are done with only one rule. With six rules,
the synthesis tool does 41.07% of the transformations
and only 180 rules govern 90.02% of the changes. If we
can statistically learn these limited number of rules then
we can revert the changes introduced by them. This
is the main reason why a machine learning reversion
attack is possible. Table II statistics is based on observing
3720 different localities (of size 3 gates) across multiple
iterations of obfuscations over the 7 largest ISCAS-85
benchmarks.
The number of types of change is limited and that
alone allows a learning process to generate the required
rules for reversion given enough statistical data. This
TABLE II: Limited number of rules govern most changes.
# Rules % Change #Rules % Change #Rules % Change
1 10.69 38 70.29 180 90.02
6 41.07 81 80.00 290 95.00
11 51.02 120 85.00 476 100.00
claim is further corroborated by the quantitative recov-
ery results in Section V. In the next section, we will
introduce our recovery attack models in details.
(a) Level-2 Change Example
(b) Level-3 Change Example 1
(c) Level-3 Change Example 2
(d) Level-3 Change Example 3
Fig. 3: Example recovery using our model.
IV. Attack Methodology
In this section, we shall formulate the three attack
models in subsections IV-B and IV-C.
A. Training Dataset Generation
Through extensive analysis, we observe that our mod-
els work best if they are trained specifically for a par-
ticular circuit. As we do not have access to the original
pre-obfuscation netlists, we take the obfuscated circuit
provided to the attacker and treat it as a Pseudo Golden
Circuit and carry out one more round of obfuscation to
create the training set. This way, we can capture the
circuit-specific information and at the same time elimi-
nate the need for a Golden Circuit. It is important to note
that the gates inserted due to the original obfuscation
are a minor fraction of the total number of gates in the
circuit and hence do not have much of an impact on the
subsequent obfuscation. We term this method Pseudo
Self Referencing.
B. Change Prediction Model
As most of the obfuscation gate localities do not
change due to the re-synthesis process, we propose a
Change Prediction Model which can determine with good
accuracy which localities change and which do not. The
model is trained using a dataset containing [Locality,
Change Indicator Boolean] pairs constructed using the
pseudo-self referencing scheme. Once trained, the model
can be used to predict whether or not a locality in
the test set (original obfuscated designs) is changed
due to synthesis. We use a Random Forest as the ML
model for our experiments. We have tried SVM, Logistic
Regression, and several other ML models, but Random
Forest gives the best results in terms of both computation
efficiency and accuracy.
C. Reconstruction Model
The Reconstruction/Reversion Model is used to lo-
cally revert the changes caused by the synthesis per-
formed after the obfuscation. The model is trained us-
ing a dataset containing [Post-Synthesis Locality, Pre-
Synthesis Locality] pairs constructed using the pseudo-
self referencing scheme. Once trained, the model can be
used to predict the Pre-Synthesis Locality given a Post-
Synthesis Locality from the test set (original obfuscated
designs). The model used for obtaining the results is
a multichannel, multilayer neural network. To further
improve the efficiency, we train multiple such models
for varying Post-Synthesis Locality sizes (from 3 gates
locality up to 10 gates locality) and combine them using a
standard cumulative confidence voting ensemble scheme
as seen in Fig. 2.
Although the Reconstruction/Reversion model works
well on it own, the accuracy can be further boosted by
using the change prediction model to determine which
localities to reconstruct and which localities to leave
alone.
V. Results and Analysis
To evaluate the effectiveness of our attack we apply
XOR logic locking on several ISCAS-85 benchmarks.
We generate training and testing sets of 11160 samples
and 3720 samples, respectively. To generate such a big
training set, we obfuscate each benchmark multiple times
in separate instances using random key-gate insertion
heuristics using the tool provided in [11]. In each instance
[8,8,8,32,64,64,64] bit keys are inserted for c1355, c1908,
c2670, c3540, c5315, c6288, and c7552, respectively. The
following sections describe our results in detail.
A. Change Prediction Model
By looking at the post-synthesized design, we can
statistically determine if the key-gate inserted locality
underwent any change. This is possible only because the
synthesis tool is not random and exhibits deterministic
nature. This effect is further exacerbated for designs
that have regular repetitive structures such as c6288
which shows 98.43% change prediction accuracy for input
locality size of 10 gates. On average, all benchmarks show
81.76% accuracy for 10 gates input locality size showing
us that the method works for a varied range of designs.
Fig. 4, shows the accuracy of the model for different
benchmarks and the effect of input locality size on the
accuracy. The average is shown in “Red” clearly indicates
that the accuracy increases with the input locality size
and plateaus after locality of size 6 gates.
B. Reconstruction Model
To evaluate the reconstruction model, we analyze how
much of the changes due to obfuscation can be recovered
locally considering an output locality size of 3 gates,
referred to as a snapshot. We can correctly recover many
Fig. 4: Accuracy of change prediction model.
Fig. 5: Effect of Post-Synthesis locality size on the R-
Metric for different benchmark circuits. E: Ensemble.
changes as evident from Table III. In case of 1 to 2
incorrect gate(s) in the snapshot (Gate Error = 1 and
Gate Error = 2), the snapshot prediction is partially
incorrect but remains useful for subsequent analysis. We
propose a metric R as shown in Eqn. 1. GE[x] stands
for GateError = x. A snapshot with 1 gate type wrong
has a weight of 2/3 and the snapshot with 2 gate types
wrong has a weight of 1/3. Link Error is defined as the
number of incorrect connections between the gates in
the predicted locality. The ensemble we use as the final
reconstruction model is made from combining several
models, separately trained using datasets with different
input locality (Post-Synthesis locality) sizes. As seen
in Fig. 5, for different benchmarks the optimal Post-
Synthesis locality size varies and the ensemble is the best
way to stabilize the variance.
R = (GE[0] ∗ 1) + (GE[1] ∗ 0.66) + (GE[2] ∗ 0.33) (1)
In Table IV, we observe the amount of complete
recovery (Gate Error = 0 and Link Error = 0) for each
type of changes. For Level-1 changes (no change) 17.4
% of the localities are incorrectly modified. To reduce
TABLE III: Accuracy for Reconstruction Model without
Change Prediction boost. G: Gate Error, L: Link Error.
G=0 L=0 G=1 L=0 G=2 L=0 R-Metric
c1355 57.49 25.83 4.16 75.91
c1908 47.50 32.50 5.83 70.87
c2670 70.00 12.50 4.16 79.62
c3540 65.62 23.75 4.58 82.80
c5315 67.50 19.47 4.79 81.93
c6288 78.54 12.70 8.43 89.70
c7552 58.95 28.64 7.29 80.25
Avg 63.65 22.19 5.60 80.15
TABLE IV: Gate Error = 0, Link Error = 0 accuracy
for Reconstruction Model (Without Change Prediction
Boost) across different types of changes.
Level-1 Level-2 Level-3
c1355 57.57 (19/33) 57.47 (50/87) NAN (0/0)
c1908 77.41 (24/31) 37.50 (33/88) 0.00 (0/1)
c2670 82.22 (37/45) 65.15 (43/66) 44.44 (4/9)
c3540 80.48 (165/205) 55.85 (143/256) 36.84 (7/19)
c5315 90.65 (291/321) 57.11 (321/562) 46.75 (36/77)
c6288 86.34 (373/432) 72.40 (349/482) 69.56 (32/46)
c7552 73.19 (213/291) 54.65 (323/591) 38.46 (30/78)
Avg 82.6(1122/1358) 59.1(1262/2132) 47.3(109/230)
TABLE V: Accuracy for Change Prediction Boosted
Reconstruction Model. G: Gate Error, L: Link Error.
G=0 L=0 G=1 L=0 G=2 L=0 R-Metric
c1355 73.33 10.00 2.50 80.75
c1908 66.66 14.16 6.66 78.20
c2670 74.16 5.83 3.33 79.10
c3540 73.95 17.08 4.79 86.80
c5315 74.89 12.50 4.20 84.52
c6288 87.50 10.62 1.45 94.98
c7552 71.14 18.02 4.89 84.64
Avg 74.51 12.60 3.97 84.14
this error, we use the Change Prediction model. From
Table V, we observe a 10.86% increase in the complete
recovery accuracy (G = 0, L = 0) and around 4%
increase in R-Metric. In Table VI, the complete recovery
accuracy (G = 0, L = 0) for different types of changes are
shown. Around 12% more of the Level-1 changes (i.e. no
change cases) are correctly recovered. In certain cases,
the locality structural changes are due to oscillating
logic simplifications over several consecutive re-synthesis
steps. However, these changes are not induced by the
inserted key-gates as the key-gates are intact in their
original form. Therefore, we do not need to do any
reconstruction/reversion for such localities. The learned
change prediction algorithm is able to detect those cases
and mark them as no change. As a result, we see ∼ 9.6%
hike in the level-2 change (simple local change) accuracy.
In Fig. 6, the effectiveness of the model is visually
represented. In Fig. 6 (a) the obfuscated design post
re-synthesis may have gone through local optimizations
around key-gates inserted localities so all such localities
are marked as red nodes and cyan nodes represent the
key input wires. Fig. 6 (b), shows the reconstructed
design after recovery. Note, that using our model, we
can only recover snapshots. The ability to automatically
stitch snapshots back into the design depends on the
type of transformation that the locality underwent. This
process can be potentially difficult, especially when the
pre and post snapshot input sizes differ. However, simply
recovering a snapshot around the inserted key-gates can
provide enough insight to expose the obfuscation process.
TABLE VI: Gate Error = 0, Link Error = 0 accuracy for
Change Prediction Boosted Reconstruction Model across
different types of changes.
Level-1 Level-2 Level-3
c1355 81.81 (27 / 33) 70.11 (61 / 87) 0.00 (0 / 0)
c1908 93.54( 29 / 31) 57.95 (51 / 88) 0.00 (0 / 1)
c2670 97.77 (44 / 45) 62.12 (41 / 66) 44.44 (4 / 9)
c3540 90.24 (185 / 205) 63.67 (163 / 256) 36.84 (7 / 19)
c5315 95.95 (308 / 321) 66.72 (375 / 562) 46.75 (36 / 77)
c6288 99.30 (429 / 432) 79.04 (381 / 482) 65.21 (30 / 46)
c7552 89.00 (259 / 291) 66.66 (394 / 591) 38.46 (30 / 78)
Avg 94.3(1281/1358) 68.7(1466/2132) 46.5(107/230)
TABLE VII: Effect of key size variation on accuracy.
Complete Recovery R-Metric
IP 0.5x 1x 2x 3x 0.5x 1x 2x 3x
c1355 90.0 73.3 71.2 71.6 90.0 80.7 82.3 82.3
c1908 80.0 66.6 67.5 65.0 91.5 78.2 78.2 81.5
c2670 90.0 74.1 77.5 80.0 96.6 79.1 86.1 86.0
c3540 75.0 73.9 76.5 79.7 89.0 86.8 86.6 89.4
c5315 78.7 74.8 78.7 73.1 85.1 84.5 86.8 83.4
c6288 91.2 87.5 83.1 86.6 96.2 94.9 92.2 93.9
c7552 71.8 71.1 69.8 70.3 85.8 84.6 83.9 84.6
Avg 82.4 74.5 74.9 75.2 90.6 84.1 85.2 85.9
TABLE VIII: Effect of different key gate insertion heuris-
tics on accuracy.
CS CY SLL
IP Acc R Acc R Acc R
c1355 87.5 95.7 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0
c1908 62.5 70.7 62.5 79.0 50.0 54.1
c2670 75.0 83.2 75.0 75.0 87.5 87.5
c3540 68.7 80.0 71.8 87.3 78.1 82.2
c5315 67.1 79.0 85.9 89.0 90.6 94.2
c6288 79.6 89.9 85.9 93.1 75.0 86.8
c7552 57.8 78.9 70.3 81.6 81.2 90.5
Avg 71.2 82.5 75.2 82.8 76.7 81.4
VI. Implications and Effectiveness
A. Scalability
1) Effect of Key Size on Performance: To observe
the effect of variation of number of Key Size, we ran-
domly inserted X (X = [8, 8, 8, 32, 64, 64, 64]) bit keys
in c1355, c1908, c2670, c3540, c5315, c6288, and c7552,
respectively. We perform this random insertion on each
benchmark separately multiple times to increase our test
data size. Next, we generate test data sets with key bits
0.5X ([4,4,4,16,32,32,32]), 2X ([16,16,16,64,128,128,128])
and 3X ([24,24,24,96,192,192,192]) by similar methods.
Table VII, shows Gate Error = 0 Link Error = 0 ac-
curacy and R-metric for reconstruction across different
key sizes. We can see a general increase in reconstruc-
tion efficiency as the key size decreases. As the ratio
KeyGate/TotalGate increases, the chance that key-gates
are inserted in close proximity also increases. Increases
in this ratio can sometimes lead to more complex trans-
formations of the key-gates after synthesis which makes
it harder to recover. For these reasons, we see a drop in
reconstruction accuracy as we increase the key size. The
effect is not persistent as we observe the accuracy is very
stable between 1x and 3x. Therefore, increasing the key
size can slightly improve structural obfuscation, but the
design is still very much exposed to a reversion attack.
2) Effect of Different Key-Gate Insertion Heuristics:
Different heuristics can be used to find the most suitable
place to insert the obfuscation gates. In Table VIII, we
see the snapshot recovery results for Logic Cone size
based insertion (CS), cyclic insertion (CY) and secure
logic locking insertion (SLL) [11]. We observe these
methods are vulnerable to our snapshot recovery attack
and have an R-Metric of over 80%.
3) Benchmark & Snapshot Size: Our method does not
depend on the size of the benchmark, rather it depends
on the size of the snapshots. Therefore, it can easily scale
to large designs. We have reported all our results for an
output locality size of 3 gates, but our model can be
trained and used for predicting a bigger snapshot.
B. Versatility
The structural information obtained through SAIL can
be used in many ways. We discuss some of them next.
(a) Obfuscated Design
(b) Recovered Design
Fig. 6: Visual representation of SAIL recovery on C6288, with 95% accuracy. Each node is a gate and edges are
connections. Green nodes are correctly recovered, and red nodes are incorrectly recovered. Cyan nodes are key inputs.
1) Key Recovery from Snapshot: For XOR based lock-
ing, recall only a XOR gate is inserted for keybit = 0
and a XOR gate followed by an Inverter is inserted for
keybit = 1. From the locality recovered using SAIL,
we can easily predict the value of the key-bit just by
observing the gates in the locality.
2) Aiding Reverse Engineering: Reverse engineering
a netlist to extract its functionality can be severely
hampered if a design is obfuscated and re-synthesized.
Using SAIL attack, we can recover each key-gate locality
in the design and make netlist reverse engineering easier.
For example, in Fig. 6, if we can successfully stitch
the snapshots, most of the changes that obfuscation
introduced can be recovered.
VII. Conclusion
We have reported a powerful and hitherto unexplored
attack modality on logic obfuscation, namely SAIL at-
tack, which exposes a critical vulnerability of these meth-
ods. Unlike existing functional attack modes, our attack
uses a fundamentally different approach that relies on
ML models to retrieve structural changes with high accu-
racy. The attack becomes possible since these obfuscation
methods introduce only small, localized, and predictable
transformations in circuit topology. We have presented
systematic steps of the attack that lead to the develop-
ment of an automatic deobfuscation tool. We have stud-
ied the efficacy of the attack in terms of both accuracy
and computation time for various obfuscation methods
and large key sizes. While we report a very high accuracy
of structural recovery for a set of benchmarks, we believe
enhanced feature selection and training approaches can
further improve the effectiveness of the attack. SAIL
attack, on one hand, is expected to enable robust security
analysis of existing obfuscation methods and on the
other hand, help the development of new methods that
are resilient to structural attacks. To protect against
SAIL attack on obfuscation, we believe, one needs to
incorporate the following two features: (1) distributed
and global structural changes; and (2) unpredictable
patterns of changes. Future work will include exploration
of robust SAIL-resistant hardware obfuscation methods.
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